Bergemann, Dirk and Pesendorfer, Martin 
ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711
(2001)
Information structures in optimal auctions.
.
Centre for Economic Policy Research (Great Britain), London, UK.
Abstract
A seller wishes to sell an object to one of multiple bidders. The valuations of the bidders are privately known. We consider the joint design problem in which the seller can decide the accuracy by which bidders learn their valuation and to whom to sell at what price. We establish that optimal information structures in an optimal auction exhibit a number of properties: (i) information structures can be represented by monotone partitions; (ii) the cardinality of each partition is finite; (iii) the partitions are asymmetric across agents. These properties imply that the optimal selling strategy of a seller can be implemented by a sequence of exclusive take-it-or-leave-it offers.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.cepr.org |
| Additional Information: | © 2001 Dirk Bergemann and Martin Pesendorfer |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief D - Microeconomics > D4 - Market Structure and Pricing > D44 - Auctions |
| Date Deposited: | 20 May 2008 10:06 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 04:03 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4913 |
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