Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence

Borgers, Tilman, Cox, Ingemar, Pesendorfer, Martin ORCID: 0000-0002-0547-8711 and Petricek, Vaclav (2007) Equilibrium bids in sponsored search auctions: theory and evidence. . Tilman Borgers, Ingemar Cox, Martin Pesendorfer and Vaclav Petricek, London, UK.

Preview

PDF Download (392kB) | Preview

Abstract

This paper presents a game theoretic analysis of the generalized second price auction that the company Overture operated in 2004 to sell sponsored search listings on its search engine. We present results that indicate that this auction has a multiplicity of Nash equilibria. We also show that weak dominance arguments do not in general select a unique Nash equilibrium. We then analyze bid data assuming that advertisers choose Nash equilibrium bids. We oer some preliminary conclusions about advertisers' true willingness to bid for sponsored search listings. We nd that advertisers' true willingness to bid is multi-dimensional and decreasing in listing position. We illustrate revenue and eciency gains of alternative auction rules. Our estimates indicate that revenues for the search term Broadband could increase by at least 49 percent if an alternative auction rule were used.

Item Type:	Monograph (Working Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 2007 the authors
Divisions:	Economics STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
Date Deposited:	19 May 2008 14:39
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 04:03
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4910

Actions (login required)

View Item