Spontaneous discrimination

Peski, Marcin and Szentes, Balázs (2013) Spontaneous discrimination. American Economic Review, 103 (6). pp. 2412-2436. ISSN 0002-8282

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Abstract

We consider a dynamic economy in which agents are repeatedly matched and decide whether or not to form profitable partnerships. Each agent has a physical color and a social color. An agent's social color acts as a signal, conveying information about the physical color of agents in his partnership history. Before an agent makes a decision, he observes his match's physical and social colors. Neither the physical color nor the social color is payoff relevant. We identify environments where equilibria arise in which agents condition their decisions on the physical and social colors of their potential partners. That is, they discriminate.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.aeaweb.org/aer/index.php
Additional Information:	© 2013 AEA
Divisions:	Economics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HT Communities. Classes. Races
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J1 - Demographic Economics > J15 - Economics of Minorities and Races; Non-labor Discrimination J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J7 - Labor Discrimination > J71 - Discrimination Z - Other Special Topics > Z1 - Cultural Economics; Economic Sociology; Economic Anthropology > Z13 - Social Norms and Social Capital; Social Networks
Date Deposited:	15 Apr 2013 15:46
Last Modified:	25 Mar 2024 01:57
Funders:	European Research Council
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/47970

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