Peretz, Ron (2012) The strategic value of recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (1). pp. 332-351. ISSN 0899-8256
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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.05.013
Abstract
This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results ( [Lehrer, 1988] and [Neyman and Okada, 2009]) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/games-and-economi... |
Additional Information: | © 2012 Elsevier |
Divisions: | Mathematics |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics |
JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games |
Date Deposited: | 23 Nov 2012 12:11 |
Last Modified: | 07 Aug 2024 03:48 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/47513 |
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