The strategic value of recall

Peretz, Ron (2012) The strategic value of recall. Games and Economic Behavior, 74 (1). pp. 332-351. ISSN 0899-8256

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Abstract

This work studies the value of two-person zero-sum repeated games in which at least one of the players is restricted to (mixtures of) bounded recall strategies. A (pure) k-recall strategy is a strategy that relies only on the last k periods of history. This work improves previous results ( [Lehrer, 1988] and [Neyman and Okada, 2009]) on repeated games with bounded recall. We provide an explicit formula for the asymptotic value of the repeated game as a function of the one-stage game, the duration of the repeated game, and the recall of the agents.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.journals.elsevier.com/games-and-economi...
Additional Information:	© 2012 Elsevier
Divisions:	Mathematics
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games; Repeated Games
Date Deposited:	23 Nov 2012 12:11
Last Modified:	12 Dec 2024 00:13
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/47513

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