Anderlini, Luca and Felli, Leonardo (1998) Costly coasian contracts. . Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.
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Abstract
We identify and investigate the basic ‘hold-up problem’ which arises whenever each party to a contract has to pay some ex-ante cost for the contract to become feasible. We then proceed to show that, under plausible circumstances, a ‘contractual solution’ to this hold-up problem is not available. This is because a contractual solution to the hold-up problem typically entails writing a ‘contract over a contract’ which generates a fresh set of ex-ante costs, and hence is associated with a new hold-up problem.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 1998 by Luca Anderlini and Leonardo Felli |
| Divisions: | Financial Markets Group STICERD Economics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights |
| Date Deposited: | 28 Feb 2008 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 18:25 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/3583 |
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