Gossner, Olivier 
ORCID: 0000-0003-3950-0208
(2010)
Ability and knowledge.
Games and Economic Behavior, 69 (1).
pp. 95-106.
ISSN 0899-8256
Abstract
In games with incomplete information, more information to a player implies a broader strategy set for this player in the normal form game, hence more knowledge implies more ability. We prove that, conversely, given two normal form games G and G′ such that players in a subset J of the set of players possess more strategies in G′ than in G, there exist two games with incomplete information with normal forms G and G′ such that players in J are more informed in the second than in the first. More ability can then be rationalized by more knowledge, and our result thus establishes the formal equivalence between ability and knowledge.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/journaldescriptio... |
| Additional Information: | © 2009 Elsevier Inc. |
| Divisions: | Mathematics |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Date Deposited: | 30 Mar 2010 14:09 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 23:39 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/27626 |
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