The property-rights theory of the firm with endogenous timing of asset purchase

de Meza, David ORCID: 0000-0002-5638-8310 and Lockwood, Ben (1998) The property-rights theory of the firm with endogenous timing of asset purchase. TE (364). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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Abstract

The standard property-rights theory of the firm assumes that prior to investing in human capital, team members meet and negotiate asset ownership. This paper endogenizes the event sequence in a matching model of market equilibrium. Equilibria exist in which, for strategic and efficiency reasons, agents invest in human capital and buy assets prior to matching and simple ownership arrangements are chosen. As in the original work, ownership of physical assets affects the incentive to invest. However, in this setting ownership creates rent shifting, search and asset transfer advantages, so new results emerge. It is no longer necessarily true that key agents own. As for the form of integration, there may be multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 1998 the authors
Divisions:	STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D2 - Production and Organizations > D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
Date Deposited:	14 Jul 2008 09:49
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 04:02
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19351

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