Cuñat, Vicente 
ORCID: 0000-0001-7504-2801
(2025)
Managerial response to shareholder empowerment: evidence from majority-voting legislation changes.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis.
ISSN 0022-1090
(In Press)
Abstract
We study how managers react to shareholder empowerment that makes votes on shareholder proposals binding. We empirically exploit staggered legislative changes that introduce such empowerment for proposals regarding majority voting in director elections. We find that managers become more responsive to shareholder requirements by initiating majority voting through either management proposals or governance guidelines. This early action crowds out shareholder proposals. Further results suggest compromised implementation: managers adopt provisions that give them greater control over the channel of implementation and allow them to retain directors who fail in elections. Our results suggest that managers retain substantial discretion to modulate shareholder requirements.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | © 2025 The Author |
| Divisions: | Finance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Mar 2025 10:21 |
| Last Modified: | 10 Apr 2025 13:48 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/127552 |
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