N-player games and mean field games of moderate interactions

Flandoli, Franco, Ghio, Maddalena and Livieri, Giulia ORCID: 0000-0002-3777-7329 (2022) N-player games and mean field games of moderate interactions. Applied Mathematics and Optimization, 85 (3). ISSN 0095-4616

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Abstract

We study the asymptotic organization among many optimizing individuals interacting in a suitable “moderate" way. We justify this limiting game by proving that its solution provides approximate Nash equilibria for large but finite player games. This proof depends upon the derivation of a law of large numbers for the empirical processes in the limit as the number of players tends to infinity. Because it is of independent interest, we prove this result in full detail. We characterize the solutions of the limiting game via a verification argument.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/journal/245
Additional Information:	© 2022, The Author(s).
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	Q Science > QA Mathematics
Date Deposited:	25 Jun 2024 15:48
Last Modified:	20 Dec 2024 00:55
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/123976

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