Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds

Dietrich, Franz and Spiekermann, Kai ORCID: 0000-0003-4983-5589 (2024) Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259

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Abstract

Does pre-voting group deliberation improve majority outcomes? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Formal results and simulations confirm this. But we identify four systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing Failure 1. Our analysis recommends deliberation that is ‘participatory’, ‘neutral’, but not necessarily ‘equal’, i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but might privilege some persons.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://link.springer.com/journal/199
Additional Information:	© 2024 The Authors
Divisions:	Government
Subjects:	J Political Science H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General
Date Deposited:	17 Jun 2024 09:18
Last Modified:	16 Nov 2024 01:48
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/123889

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