Bank capital regulation with random audits

Bhattacharya, Sudipto, Plank, Manfred, Strobl, Gunter and Zechner, Josef (2000) Bank capital regulation with random audits. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (354). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

We consider a model of optimal bank closure rules (cum capital replenishment by banks), with Poisson-distributed audits of the bank's asset value by the regulator, with the goal of eliminating (ameliorating) the incentives of levered bank shareholders/managers to take excessive risks in their choice of underlying assets. The roles of (tax or other) subsidies on deposit interest payments by the bank, and of the auditing frequency are examined.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2000 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G20 - General G - Financial Economics > G2 - Financial Institutions and Services > G21 - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2023 14:27
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 04:32
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119103

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