The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts

Chaigneau, Pierre (2012) The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (697). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

We use a comparative approach to study the incentives provided by different types of compensation contracts, and their valuation by risk averse managers, in a fairly general setting. We show that concave contracts tend to provide more incentives to risk averse managers, while convex contracts tend to be more valued by prudent managers. Thus, prudence can contribute to explain the prevalence of stock-options in executive compensation. We also present a condition on the utility function which enables to compare the structure of optimal contracts associated with different risk preferences.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2012 The Author
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D86 - Economics of Contract: Theory J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
Date Deposited:	26 Jun 2023 14:54
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 04:31
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119055

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