Information, market power and welfare

Lou, Youcheng and Rahi, Rohit ORCID: 0000-0001-6887-9160 (2021) Information, market power and welfare. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (842). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

Text (DP842) - Published Version Download (1MB)

• https://www.fmg.ac.uk/publications/discu...

Abstract

We study a financial market in which agents with interdependent values bid for a risky asset. Some agents are privately informed of their own value for the asset while others seek to infer it from the equilibrium price. Due to adverse selection, uninformed agents are less willing than the informed to provide liquidity, and engage in greater bid shading when prices are more informative. While increased participation by informed agents leads to perfect competition in the limit, the market remains illiquid to some degree even with free entry of uninformed traders. The incentive to produce information is increasing in market size and is maximal in a perfectly competitive economy. Price informativeness, on the other hand, is independent of market size. Curtailing information production by one group can reduce adverse selection, and improve liquidity and welfare for all agents.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2021 The Author(s)
Divisions:	Finance
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies
Date Deposited:	16 May 2023 13:27
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 04:24
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/118843

Actions (login required)

View Item