Ashraf, Nava ORCID: 0000-0003-3014-8439, Bandiera, Oriana
ORCID: 0009-0002-6817-793X and Lee, Scott S.
(2014)
Awards unbundled: evidence from a natural field experiment.
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 100.
pp. 44-63.
ISSN 0167-2681
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Abstract
Organizations often use non-monetary awards to incentivize performance. Awards may affect behavior through several mechanisms: by conferring employer recognition, by enhancing social visibility, and by facilitating social comparison. In a nationwide health worker training program in Zambia, we design a field experiment to unbundle these mechanisms. We find that employer recognition and social visibility increase performance while social comparison reduces it, especially for low-ability trainees. These effects appear when treatments are announced and persist through training. The findings are consistent with a model of optimal expectations in which low-ability individuals exert low effort in order to avoid information about their relative ability.
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