Miller, Susan M. (2014) Government programs headed by recess appointees have poorer performance than those managed by non-recess appointees and careerists. LSE American Politics and Policy (30 Sep 2014). Website.
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Abstract
American politics is polarized as never before, something that is also reflected in Congress. This polarization means that it has become increasingly difficulty for the Executive to gain approval for their government appointments in the Senate. One way that the President can circumvent this problem is to make appointments whilst the Senate is in recess. But what are the consequences of recess appointments? In new research, Susan M. Miller finds that government programs managed by recess appointees are associated with lower performance than those managed by non-recess appointments and career professionals. She argues that, in light of these findings, reforms such as last year’s move to limit the threat of filibuster for executive and some judicial positions may be a step in the right direction towards reducing the Executive’s need to make recess appointments.
| Item Type: | Online resource (Website) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2014 The Author |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor > HD28 Management. Industrial Management J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JK Political institutions (United States) |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2014 10:02 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Sep 2024 19:07 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/59835 |
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