Kirchsteiger, Georg and Prat, Andrea (2001) Inefficient equilibria in lobbying. Journal of Public Economics, 82 (3). pp. 349-375. ISSN 0047-2727
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Identification Number: 10.1016/S0047-2727(00)00134-1
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00472... |
| Additional Information: | © 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. |
| Divisions: | Economics STICERD |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C92 - Laboratory, Group Behavior D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games |
| Date Deposited: | 03 Apr 2008 11:08 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Sep 2025 06:25 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/4077 |
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