Dynamic voting in clubs

Roberts, Kevin (1999) Dynamic voting in clubs. TE (367). Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, London, UK.

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Abstract

This paper examines the process and outcomes of democratic decision-making in clubs where a club is defined by their sets of members whose preferences and decisions relate to the set of members in the club: the electorate to endogenous. Examples range from international organizations like the European Union and NATO to firms, workers' cooperatives and trade unions. Although the policy space is infinite, a majority voting equilibrium exists under plausible conditions and the equilibrium rule and the dynamics of clubs are characterised. Two types of club, one where a group funds some public good and the other where a given benefit is shared by the group, are analysed in detail.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	http://sticerd.lse.ac.uk
Additional Information:	© 1999 Kevin Roberts
Divisions:	STICERD
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor H Social Sciences > HV Social pathology. Social and public welfare. Criminology
JEL classification:	C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C72 - Noncooperative Games H - Public Economics > H4 - Publicly Provided Goods > H41 - Public Goods D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations L - Industrial Organization > L2 - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior > L20 - General D - Microeconomics > D9 - Intertemporal Choice and Growth > D92 - Intertemporal Firm Choice and Growth, Investment, or Financing
Date Deposited:	14 Jul 2008 09:35
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 19:40
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/19349

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