Dietrich, Franz and Spiekermann, Kai ORCID: 0000-0003-4983-5589 (2024) Deliberation and the wisdom of crowds. Economic Theory. ISSN 0938-2259
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Abstract
Does pre-voting group deliberation improve majority outcomes? To address this question, we develop a probabilistic model of opinion formation and deliberation. Two new jury theorems, one pre-deliberation and one post-deliberation, suggest that deliberation is beneficial. Successful deliberation mitigates three voting failures: (1) overcounting widespread evidence, (2) neglecting evidential inequality, and (3) neglecting evidential complementarity. Formal results and simulations confirm this. But we identify four systematic exceptions where deliberation reduces majority competence, always by increasing Failure 1. Our analysis recommends deliberation that is ‘participatory’, ‘neutral’, but not necessarily ‘equal’, i.e., that involves substantive sharing, privileges no evidences, but might privilege some persons.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://link.springer.com/journal/199 |
Additional Information: | © 2024 The Authors |
Divisions: | Government |
Subjects: | J Political Science H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D80 - General |
Date Deposited: | 17 Jun 2024 09:18 |
Last Modified: | 04 Oct 2024 20:39 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/123889 |
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