The optimal timing of executive compensation

Chaigneau, Pierre (2010) The optimal timing of executive compensation. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (660). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.

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Abstract

We propose a new continuous-time principal-agent model to study the optimal timing of stock-based incentives, when the effects of managerial actions materialize with a lag and are only progressively understood by shareholders. On the one hand, early contingent compensation hedges the manager against the accumulation of exogenous shocks. On the other hand, the fact that initial information asymmetries between the manager and shareholders are progressively resolved suggests that contingent compensation should be postponed. We introduce two possible types of managerial short-termism, and show that they both result in lower-powered incentives and more deferred compensation.

Item Type:	Monograph (Discussion Paper)
Official URL:	https://www.fmg.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2010 The Author
Divisions:	Financial Markets Group
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HG Finance
JEL classification:	G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G34 - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance J - Labor and Demographic Economics > J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs > J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods M - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting > M5 - Personnel Economics > M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs, seniority issues)
Date Deposited:	29 Jun 2023 12:18
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 04:32
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/119081

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