National officials working for the Commission display a surprising amount of independence from their own governments

Trondal, Jarle, Murdoch, Zuzana and Geys, Benny (2015) National officials working for the Commission display a surprising amount of independence from their own governments. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (12 Feb 2015). Website.

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Abstract

When national officials are appointed to international administrations such as the European Commission, how can we ensure that they act independently, rather than merely in the interest of their own national government? Jarle Trondal, Zuzana Murdoch and Benny Geys present findings from a survey of national officials who have been ‘seconded’ to the Commission for a specific period of time. Their research shows that even though there should arguably be an incentive for such individuals to retain loyalty to their national government, there is greater attachment to the Commission than might be expected, particularly when national officials feel they are being treated in the same manner as permanent Commission staff.

Item Type:	Online resource (Website)
Official URL:	http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Additional Information:	© 2015 The Author(s)
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Date Deposited:	29 Mar 2017 14:39
Last Modified:	15 Sep 2023 19:55
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/71502

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