Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X
(2008)
A liberal paradox for judgment aggregation.
Social Choice and Welfare, 31 (1).
pp. 59-78.
ISSN 0176-1714
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Abstract
In the emerging literature on judgment aggregation over logically connected propositions, expert rights or liberal rights have not been investigated yet. A group making collective judgments may assign individual members or subgroups with expert knowledge on, or particularly affected by, certain propositions the right to determine the collective judgment on those propositions. We identify a problem that generalizes Sen’s ‘liberal paradox’. Under plausible conditions, the assignment of rights to two or more individuals or subgroups is inconsistent with the unanimity principle, whereby unanimously accepted propositions are collectively accepted. The inconsistency can be avoided if individual judgments or rights satisfy special conditions.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.springerlink.com/link.asp?id=100385 |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 Springer-Verlag |
| Divisions: | Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Jun 2008 11:53 |
| Last Modified: | 03 Apr 2024 02:39 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5802 |
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