Gaertner, Wulf and Xu, Yongsheng (2012) A general scoring rule. Mathematical Social Sciences, 63 (3). pp. 193-196. ISSN 0165-4896
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Identification Number: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2012.01.006
Abstract
This paper studies a ranking rule of the following type axiomatically: each voter places k candidates into n categories with ranks from n to 1 attached to these categories, the candidate(s) with the highest aggregate score is (are) the winner(s). We show that it is characterized by a monotonicity condition and a multi-stage cancellation property
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/mathematical-soci... |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Elsevier B.V. |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Nov 2013 11:57 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Nov 2025 07:07 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/54509 |
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