Levy, Gilat (2004) Anti-herding and strategic consultation. European Economic Review, 48 (3). pp. 503-525. ISSN 0014-2921
|
PDF
Download (423kB) | Preview |
Abstract
In this paper I analyze how careerist decision makers aggregate and use information provided by others. I find that decision makers who are motivated by reputation concerns tend to ‘anti-herding’, i.e., they excessively contradict public information such as the prior or others’ recommendations. I also find that some decision makers may deliberately act unilaterally and not consult advisers although advice is costless. Moreover, advisers to the decision maker may not report their information truthfully. Even if the advisers care only about the outcome, they bias their recommendation since they anticipate inefficient anti-herding behavior by the decision maker.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer |
| Additional Information: | Copyright © 2003 Elsevier B.V. LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk>) of the LSE Research Online website. |
| Divisions: | Economics |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Dec 2005 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Apr 2024 16:24 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/541 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
Download Statistics
Download Statistics