Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X
(2010)
Majority voting on restricted domains.
Journal of Economic Theory, 145 (2).
pp. 512-543.
ISSN 1095-7235
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Abstract
In judgment aggregation, unlike preference aggregation, not much is known about domain restrictions that guarantee consistent majority outcomes. We introduce several conditions on individual judgments sufficient for consistent majority judgments. Some are based on global orders of propositions or individuals, others on local orders, still others not on orders at all. Some generalize classic social-choice-theoretic domain conditions, others have no counterpart. Our most general condition generalizes Sen's triplewise value-restriction, itself the most general classic condition. We also prove a new characterization theorem: for a large class of domains, if there exists any aggregation function satisfying some democratic conditions, then majority voting is the unique such function. Taken together, our results support the robustness of majority rule.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00220... |
| Additional Information: | © 2010 Elsevier B.V. |
| Divisions: | Government CPNSS Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) |
| JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D70 - General D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D71 - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations |
| Date Deposited: | 08 May 2010 12:46 |
| Last Modified: | 05 Jan 2024 07:42 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/27902 |
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