Electoral fraud or violence: the effect of observers on party manipulation strategies

Asunka, Joseph, Brierley, Sarah ORCID: 0000-0002-0902-6763, Golden, Miriam, Kramon, Eric and Ofosu, George ORCID: 0000-0003-4112-0749 (2019) Electoral fraud or violence: the effect of observers on party manipulation strategies. British Journal of Political Science, 49 (1). 129 - 151. ISSN 0007-1234

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Abstract

This article reports on the effects of domestic election observers on electoral fraud and violence. Using an experimental research design and polling station data on fraud and violence during Ghana's 2012 elections, it shows that observers reduced fraud and violence at the polling stations which they monitored. It is argued that local electoral competition shapes party activists' response to observers. As expected, in single-party dominant areas, parties used their local political networks to relocate fraud to polling stations without an election observer, and, in contrast, party activists relocated violence to stations without observers in competitive areas - a response that requires less local organizational capacity. This highlights how local party organization and electoral incentives can shape the manipulative electoral strategies employed by parties in democratic elections.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/british-jo...
Additional Information:	© 2019 Cambridge University Press
Divisions:	Government
Subjects:	J Political Science > JC Political theory
Date Deposited:	14 Aug 2019 23:17
Last Modified:	25 Oct 2024 05:45
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/101364

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