Items where Author is "Gottlieb, Daniel"

Article

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2024) A theory of fair CEO pay. American Economic Review. ISSN 0002-8282 (In Press)

Dillenberger, David, Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Ortoleva, Pietro (2024) Stochastic impatience and the separation of time and risk preferences. Theoretical Economics. ISSN 1933-6837 (In Press)

Citanna, Alex, Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185, Siconolfi, Paolo and Zhang, Xingtan (2023) Corrigendum: long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents (Econometrica, 89, 2, (793–824), 10.3982/ECTA17126). Econometrica, 91 (3). 25 - 30. ISSN 0012-9682

Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Moreira, Humberto (2022) Simple contracts with adverse selection and moral hazard. Theoretical Economics, 17 (3). 1357 – 1401. ISSN 1933-6837

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2022) How should performance signals affect contracts? Review of Financial Studies, 35 (1). 168 - 206. ISSN 0893-9454

Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Smetters, Kent (2021) Lapse-based insurance. American Economic Review, 111 (8). 2377 - 2416. ISSN 0002-8282

Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Zhang, Xingtan (2021) Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents. Econometrica, 89 (2). 793 - 824. ISSN 0012-9682

DeJarnette, Patrick, Dillenberger, David, Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Ortoleva, Pietro (2020) Time lotteries and stochastic impatience. Econometrica, 88 (2). 619 - 656. ISSN 0012-9682

Bursztyn, Leonardo, Fiorin, Stefano, Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Kanz, Martin (2019) Moral incentives in credit card debt repayment: evidence from a field experiment. Journal of Political Economy, 127 (4). 1641 - 1683. ISSN 0022-3808

Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Mitchell, Olivia S (2019) Narrow framing and long-term care insurance. Journal of Risk and Insurance. pp. 1-33. ISSN 0022-4367

Azevedo, Eduardo M. and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2019) An example of non-existence of Riley equilibrium in markets with adverse selection. Games and Economic Behavior, 116. 152 - 157. ISSN 0899-8256

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2019) The informativeness principle without the first-order approach. Games and Economic Behavior, 113. 743 - 755. ISSN 0899-8256

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2018) Does improved information improve incentives? Journal of Financial Economics, 130 (2). 291 - 307. ISSN 0304-405X

Azevedo, Eduardo M. and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2017) Perfect competition in markets with adverse selection. Econometrica, 85 (1). 67 - 105. ISSN 0012-9682

Gomes, Renato, Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Maestri, Lucas (2016) Experimentation and project selection: screening and learning. Games and Economic Behavior, 96. 145 - 169. ISSN 0899-8256

Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2014) Imperfect memory and choice under risk. Games and Economic Behavior, 85. 127 - 158. ISSN 0899-8256

Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Moreira, Humberto (2012) Should educational policies be regressive? Journal of Public Economic Theory, 14 (4). 601 - 623. ISSN 1097-3923

Azevedo, Eduardo M. and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2012) Risk-neutral firms can extract unbounded profits from consumers with prospect theory preferences. Journal of Economic Theory, 147 (3). 1291 - 1299. ISSN 0022-0531

Monograph

Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 and Zhang, Xingtan (2018) Long-term contracting with time-inconsistent agents. . SSRN. (Unpublished)

Chaigneau, Pierre, Edmans, Alex and Gottlieb, Daniel ORCID: 0000-0002-0555-6185 (2014) The value of informativeness for contracting. Financial Markets Group Discussion Papers (737). Financial Markets Group, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.