Cookies?
Library Header Image
LSE Research Online LSE Library Services

Imperfect memory and choice under risk

Gottlieb, Daniel (2014) Imperfect memory and choice under risk. Games and Economic Behavior, 85. 127 - 158. ISSN 0899-8256

Full text not available from this repository.
Identification Number: 10.1016/j.geb.2013.11.013

Abstract

This paper presents a model of choice based on imperfect memory and self-deception. I assume that people have preferences over their own attributes (e.g., skill, knowledge, or competence) and can manipulate their memories. The model provides a prior-dependent theory of regret aversion and allows for prior-dependent information attitudes. It implies that behavior will converge to the one predicted by expected utility theory after a choice has been faced a sufficiently large number of times.

Item Type: Article
Official URL: https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/games-and-ec...
Additional Information: © 2013 Elsevier Inc.
Divisions: Management
Subjects: H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory
B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BF Psychology
JEL classification: C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory > C70 - General
Date Deposited: 26 Oct 2019 12:06
Last Modified: 20 Jan 2020 07:06
URI: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/102230

Actions (login required)

View Item View Item