Careerist judges

Levy, Gilat ORCID: 0009-0006-7641-1668 (2005) Careerist judges. RAND Journal of Economics, 36 (2). pp. 275-297. ISSN 0741-6261

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Abstract

uncover during deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly. If an appeal is brought, the appellate court's decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge's ability. The monitoring possibilities for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the judge's decision. I find that judges with career concerns tend to be "creative," i.e., to inefficiently contradict previous decisions.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.rje.org/
Additional Information:	© 2005 RAND Corporation
Divisions:	Economics STICERD
Subjects:	J Political Science > JF Political institutions (General)
JEL classification:	D - Microeconomics > D7 - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making > D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Date Deposited:	14 Jun 2007
Last Modified:	01 Oct 2024 03:33
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/939

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