Three concepts of rights, two of property

Webb, Charlie ORCID: 0009-0001-0864-1764 (2018) Three concepts of rights, two of property. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, 38 (2). 246 – 269. ISSN 0143-6503

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Abstract

Sometimes rights are taken to describe concrete, bottom-line entitlements, sometimes a kind of ground of such entitlements. I suggest that this difference reflects not so much disagreement or uncertainty as to the nature of rights as different applications and senses of the term ‘right’, each expressing a different idea or concept. Much work on rights is compromised by a failure to distinguish these concepts of a right, nowhere more so than in private law, where it accounts for difficulties lawyers have faced when seeking to distinguish personal (in personam) and proprietary (in rem) rights.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://academic.oup.com/ojls
Additional Information:	© 2018 Oxford University Press
Divisions:	Law
Subjects:	K Law > K Law (General)
Date Deposited:	18 Apr 2018 13:22
Last Modified:	11 Dec 2024 21:36
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/87523

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