Alonso, Ricardo ORCID: 0000-0001-9559-0864 and Câmara, Odilon
(2018)
On the value of persuasion by experts.
Journal of Economic Theory, 174.
pp. 103-123.
ISSN 0022-0531
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Text (PersuasionExpert_2017_09_15)
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Abstract
We consider a persuasion model in which a sender influences the actions of a receiver by selecting an experiment (public signal) from a set of feasible experiments. We ask: does the sender benefit from becoming an expert — observing a private signal prior to her selection? We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for a sender to never gain by becoming informed. Our key condition (sequential redundancy) shows that the informativeness of public experiments can substitute for the sender's expertise. We then provide conditions for private information to strictly benefit or strictly hurt the sender. Expertise is beneficial when the sender values the ability to change her experimental choice according to her private information. When the sender does not gain from expertise, she is strictly hurt when different types cannot pool on an optimal experiment.
Item Type: | Article |
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Official URL: | https://www.journals.elsevier.com/journal-of-econo... |
Additional Information: | © 2017 Elsevier Inc. |
Divisions: | Management |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
JEL classification: | D - Microeconomics > D8 - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty > D83 - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief |
Date Deposited: | 02 Jan 2018 11:54 |
Last Modified: | 16 Aug 2024 21:45 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/86370 |
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