How it makes a moral difference that one is worse off than one could have been

Otsuka, Michael (2018) How it makes a moral difference that one is worse off than one could have been. Politics, Philosophy & Economics, 17 (2). 192 - 215. ISSN 1470-594X

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Abstract

In this article, I argue that it makes a moral difference whether an individual is worse off than she could have been. Here I part company with consequentialists such as Parfit and side with contractualists such as Scanlon. But, unlike some contractualists, I reject the view that all that matters is whether a principle can be justified to each particular individual, where such a justification is attentive to her interests, complaints, and other claims. The anonymous goodness of a distribution also matters. My attempt to reconcile contractualist and consequentialist approaches proceeds via a serious of reflections on cases.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/journal/politics-...
Additional Information:	© 2017 The Author
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited:	14 Oct 2017 11:53
Last Modified:	10 Oct 2024 23:27
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/84663

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