Garicano, Luis and Rayo, Luis (2017) Relational knowledge transfers. American Economic Review, 107 (9). pp. 2695-2730. ISSN 0002-8282
|
Text
- Accepted Version
Download (528kB) | Preview |
Abstract
We study how relational contracts mitigate Becker's classic problem of providing general (non-firm-specific) human capital when training contracts are incomplete. The firms profit-maximizing agreement is a multi-period "apprenticeship" in which the novice is trained gradually over time and eventually receives all knowledge. The firm adopts a "1/e rule" whereby at the beginning of the relationship the novice is trained, for free, just enough to produce a fraction 1/e of the efficient output. After that, the novice earns all additional knowledge with labor. This rule causes inefficiently lengthy relationships that grow longer the more patient the players. We discuss policy interventions.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | https://www.aeaweb.org/journals/aer |
| Additional Information: | © 2017 American Economic Association |
| Divisions: | Economics Management Centre for Economic Performance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HD Industries. Land use. Labor |
| Date Deposited: | 02 Jun 2017 14:45 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 01:29 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/79076 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
Download Statistics
Download Statistics