Greene, Zachary and Haber, Matthias (2017) How electoral competition explains preference convergence and divergence in pre-electoral coalitions. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (06 Apr 2017). Website.
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Abstract
While most coalition governments form after the results of an election, some parties choose to announce their intention to form pre-electoral coalitions before a vote has been held. Based on a recent study, Zachary Greene and Matthias Haber explore why parties, which are usually in direct conflict with one another for electoral support, choose to engage in this kind of cooperation. Their findings highlight that close competitors can often use their electoral context to mutual advantage and that parties do not always benefit from strictly adversarial approaches.
| Item Type: | Online resource (Website) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2017 The Author(s) |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | J Political Science > JC Political theory J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
| Date Deposited: | 06 Apr 2017 08:10 |
| Last Modified: | 14 Sep 2024 01:14 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/72722 |
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