Making regulatory agencies independent is not always a recipe for better decision-making

Jordana, Jacint and Rosas, Guillermo (2014) Making regulatory agencies independent is not always a recipe for better decision-making. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (16 Oct 2014). Website.

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Abstract

The principle of making certain bodies independent from government, such as regulatory agencies or central banks, has become popular in a number of contexts over recent decades. As Jacint Jordana and Guillermo Rosas write, the basic assumption underpinning the principle is that electoral pressures can have a negative effect on decision-making in certain policy areas. However, using evidence from a study of banking regulatory agencies across 81 countries, they illustrate that the benefits of independence depend largely on the political context within a given state. This suggests that while independence can be beneficial in some cases, greater attention should be paid to the individual circumstances within particular countries.

Item Type:	Online resource (Website)
Official URL:	http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/
Additional Information:	© 2014 The Author(s)
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Date Deposited:	30 Mar 2017 12:35
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 19:15
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/71696

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