Delegating political powers to regulatory agencies does not guarantee better policy enforcement

Guidi, Mattia (2015) Delegating political powers to regulatory agencies does not guarantee better policy enforcement. LSE European Politics and Policy (EUROPP) Blog (09 Sep 2015). Website.

Preview

PDF Download (124kB) | Preview

• Publisher

Abstract

A large number of independent regulatory agencies, which are detached from the electoral cycle, have been set up by governments to ensure sound, stable and impartial policy enforcement. But has their independence actually made a difference? Outlining results from a recent study, Mattia Guidi assesses the impact national competition agencies (NCAs) have had on two relevant indicators, foreign direct investment and inflation, finding that there is no correlation at all between these indicators and the independence of NCAs.

Item Type:	Online resource (Website)
Official URL:	http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/
Additional Information:	© 2017 The Author(s)
Divisions:	LSE
Subjects:	J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe)
Date Deposited:	27 Mar 2017 15:25
Last Modified:	13 Sep 2024 23:58
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/70993

Actions (login required)

View Item