Toussaert, Séverine (2017) Intention-based reciprocity and signaling of intentions. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 137. pp. 132-144. ISSN 0167-2681
|
PDF
- Accepted Version
Download (1MB) | Preview |
Abstract
Many experiments find that trust intentions are a key determinant of prosociality. If intentions matter, then prosociality should depend on whether trust intentions can be credibly conveyed. This conjecture is formalized and tested in a noisy trust game where I vary the extent to which trust can be credibly signaled. I find that the introduction of noise threatens the onset of trust relations and induces players to form more pessimistic beliefs. Therefore policies that increase transparency of the decision-making environment may foster prosociality. However, the potential impact of such policies could be limited by a large heterogeneity in how individuals respond to changes in their information environment.
Item Type: | Article |
---|---|
Official URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/01672... |
Additional Information: | © 2017 Elsevier |
Divisions: | Social Policy |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HM Sociology |
JEL classification: | C - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods > C9 - Design of Experiments > C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement D - Microeconomics > D6 - Welfare Economics > D64 - Altruism |
Date Deposited: | 13 Mar 2017 15:23 |
Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 01:26 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/69803 |
Actions (login required)
View Item |