Fetzer, Thiemo and Marden, Samuel (2016) Take what you can: property rights, contestability andconflict. SERC discussion papers (SERCDP0194). Spatial Economics Research Centre, London, UK.
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Abstract
Weak property rights are strongly associated with underdevelopment, low state capacity and civil conflict. In economic models of conflict, outbreaks of violence require two things: the prize must be both valuable and contestable. This paper exploits spatial and temporal variation in contestability of land title to explore the relation between (in)secure property rights and conflict in the Brazilian Amazon. Our estimates suggest that, at the local level, assignment of secure property rights eliminates substantively all land related conflict, even without changes in enforcement. Changes in land use are also consistent with reductions in land related conflict.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
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| Official URL: | http://www.spatialeconomics.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2016 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Spatial Economics Research Centre Centre for Economic Performance |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions |
| Date Deposited: | 17 May 2016 11:59 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 19:21 |
| Funders: | Economic and Social Research Council, Economic and Social Research Council |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/66534 |
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