Mahtani, Anna 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1581-4325
(2017)
Deference, respect and intensionality.
Philosophical Studies, 174 (1).
pp. 163-183.
ISSN 0031-8116
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Abstract
This paper is about the standard Reflection Principle (van Fraassen, 1984) and the Group Reflection Principle (Elga, 2007; Bovens & Rabinowicz, 2011; Titelbaum, 2012; Hedden, 2015). I argue that these principles are incomplete as they stand. The key point is that deference is an intensional relation, and so whether you are rationally required to defer to a person at a time can depend on how that person and that time are designated. In this paper I suggest a way of completing the Reflection Principle and Group Reflection Principle, and I argue that so completed these principles are plausible. In particular, they do not fall foul of the Sleeping Beauty case (Elga, 2000), the Cable Guy Paradox (Hajek, 2005) , Arntzenius' prisoner cases (Arntzenius, 2003), or the Puzzle of the Hats (Bovens & Rabinowicz, 2011).
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://link.springer.com/journal/11098 |
| Additional Information: | © 2016 The Author © CC BY 4.0 |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 13 Apr 2016 15:25 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Apr 2024 02:33 |
| Funders: | Leverhulme Trust |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/66096 |
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