Nax, Heinrich H., Murphy, Ryan O. and Ackermann, Kurt A. (2015) Interactive preferences. Economics Letters, 135. pp. 133-136. ISSN 0165-1765
|
PDF
- Accepted Version
Download (393kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Game theory presumes that agents have unique preference orderings over outcomes that prescribe unique preference orderings over actions in response to other players’ actions, independent of other players’ preferences. This independence assumption is necessary to permit game-theoretic best response reasoning, but at odds with introspection, because preferences toward one another often dynamically depend on each other. In this note, we propose a model of interactive preferences. The model is validated with data from a laboratory experiment. The main finding of our study is that pro-sociality diminishes over the course of the interactions.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.elsevier.com/economics-letters |
| Additional Information: | © 2015 Elsevier B.V. |
| Divisions: | CPNSS |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) Q Science > QA Mathematics |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Feb 2016 15:11 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 00:59 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/65430 |
Actions (login required)
 |
View Item |
Download Statistics
Download Statistics