What probability probably isn't

Howson, Colin (2015) What probability probably isn't. Analysis, 75 (1). pp. 53-59. ISSN 0003-2638

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Abstract

Joyce and others have claimed that degrees of belief are estimates of truth-values and that the probability axioms are conditions of admissibility for these estimates with respect to a scoring rule penalising inaccuracy. In this paper I argue that the claim that the rules of probability are truth-directed in this way depends on an assumption which is both implausible and lacks any supporting evidence, strongly suggesting that the probability axioms have nothing intrinsically to do with truth-directedness.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://analysis.oxfordjournals.org/
Additional Information:	© 2014 The Author
Divisions:	Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method
Subjects:	B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General)
Date Deposited:	11 Nov 2015 11:01
Last Modified:	14 Sep 2024 06:52
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/64397

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