Mabbett, Deborah and Schelkle, Waltraud ORCID: 0000-0003-4127-107X
(2016)
Searching under the lamp-post: the evolution of fiscal surveillance.
In: Caporaso, James A. and Rhodes, Martin, (eds.)
Political and Economic Dynamics of the Eurozone Crisis.
Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK.
ISBN 9780198755739
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Abstract
Why is the Euro area economy laboring under the burden of fiscal austerity? Critics argue that an ideological bias towards austerity has been institutionalized in the EU’s fiscal rules. We examine this claim by contrasting a ‘disciplinarian’ account of fiscal surveillance with a welfare-maximising approach and using this to review how fiscal surveillance by the European Commission has been practiced since the financial crisis. While we find that Eurostat’s practices bear some marks of disciplinarianism, particularly in bringing the fiscal consequences of reckless behavior by banks into the beam of the fiscal surveillance lamp, the Commission’s welfare maximising orientation is reflected in its efforts to identify and partition out financial, macroeconomic and budgetary contributions to fiscal outturns and thereby avoid an excessively disciplinarian orientation. Its efforts are impeded by a lack of supranational institutions to resolve bank failures and conduct countercyclical policy. These institutional deficits, rather than an entrenched ideological standpoint, explain the persistence of austerity.
Item Type: | Book Section |
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Official URL: | http://ukcatalogue.oup.com/home.do |
Additional Information: | © 2016 The Authors |
Divisions: | European Institute |
Subjects: | J Political Science > JA Political science (General) J Political Science > JN Political institutions (Europe) |
Date Deposited: | 29 Oct 2015 10:04 |
Last Modified: | 18 Jul 2024 12:18 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/64216 |
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