Valentini, Laura (2012) Kant, Ripstein and the circle of freedom: a critical note. European Journal of Philosophy, 20 (3). pp. 450-459. ISSN 0966-8373
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
Much contemporary political philosophy claims to be Kant-inspired, but its aims and method differ from Kant's own. In his recent book, Force and Freedom, Arthur Ripstein advocates a more orthodox Kantian outlook, presenting it as superior to dominant (Kant-inspired) views. The most striking feature of this outlook is its attempt to ground the whole of political morality in one right: the right to freedom, understood as the right to be independent of others’ choices. Is Ripstein's Kantian project successful? In this research note I argue that it is not. First, I suggest that Ripstein's notion of freedom is viciously circular. It is meant to ground all rights, but in fact it presupposes an account of those rights. Second, I show that—independently of its inability to ground a whole political morality—such a moralized understanding of freedom is normatively unappealing.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(IS... |
| Additional Information: | © 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd |
| Divisions: | Government |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) J Political Science > JA Political science (General) |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Sep 2015 14:42 |
| Last Modified: | 13 Nov 2024 20:30 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/63690 |
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