Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution control

Fredriksson, Per G., Neumayer, Eric ORCID: 0000-0003-2719-7563, Damania, Richard and Gates, Scott (2005) Environmentalism, democracy, and pollution control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 49 (2). 343 -365. ISSN 1096-0449

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Abstract

This paper makes two empirical contributions to the literature, based on predictions generated by a lobby group model. First, we investigate how environmental lobby groups affect the determination of environmental policy in rich and developing countries. Second, we explore the interaction between democratic participation and political (electoral) competition. The empirical findings suggest that environmental lobby groups tend to positively affect the stringency of environmental policy. Moreover, political competition tends to raise policy stringency, in particular where citizens’ participation in the democratic process is widespread.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jeem
Additional Information:	Published 2004 © Elsevier Inc. LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access research output of the School. Copyright and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (<http://eprints.lse.ac.uk>) of the LSE Research Online website.
Divisions:	Geography & Environment
Subjects:	J Political Science > JC Political theory H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory G Geography. Anthropology. Recreation > GE Environmental Sciences
Date Deposited:	18 May 2006
Last Modified:	02 Apr 2024 16:24
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/630

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