Stefansson, H. Orii and Bradley, Richard 
ORCID: 0000-0003-2184-7844
(2015)
How valuable are chances?
Philosophy of Science, 82 (4).
pp. 602-625.
ISSN 0031-8248
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Abstract
Chance Neutrality is the thesis that, conditional on some proposition being true (or being false), its chance of being true should be a matter of practical indifference. The aim of this paper is to examine whether Chance Neutrality is a requirement of rationality. We prove that given Chance Neutrality, the Principal Principle entails a thesis called Linearity; the centrepiece of von Neumann and Morgenstern’s expected utility theory. With this in mind, we argue that the Principal Principle is a requirement of practical rationality but that Linearity is not; and hence, that Chance Neutrality is not rationally required.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://journal.philsci.org/ |
| Additional Information: | ©2015 by the Philosophy of Science Association. |
| Divisions: | Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
| Subjects: | B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > BC Logic |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Jul 2015 13:27 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Dec 2024 00:55 |
| Projects: | 14-AXA-PDOC-222, AH/J006033/1, AH/I003118/1 |
| Funders: | AXA, Arts and Humanities Research Council |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/62780 |
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