Chwieroth, Jeffrey 
ORCID: 0000-0001-8965-0621 and Walter, Andrew
(2015)
Great expectations, veto players, and the changing politics of banking crises.
Systemic Risk Centre Discussion Papers (28).
Systemic Risk Centre, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London, UK.
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Abstract
How have the politics of banking crises changed over the long run? Unlike existing static accounts, we offer a dynamic theory emphasizing how the emergence of voters’ “great expectations” after the 1930s concerning crisis prevention and mitigation reshaped the politics of banking crises in many democratic countries. We argue that both variations over time, centred on the emergence of these expectations, and variations within democratic countries, based on how veto players constrain policy change, exerted an important influence on the propensity of voters to punish incumbent political parties in the aftermath of banking crises. We find strong support for our argument using a new dataset of 100 democratic countries from 1831 – 2011. Political punishment in the aftermath of a banking crisis is mainly a modern phenomenon and is most evident in systems with polarized veto players.
| Item Type: | Monograph (Discussion Paper) |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.systemicrisk.ac.uk/ |
| Additional Information: | © 2015 The Authors |
| Divisions: | Systemic Risk Centre International Relations |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| JEL classification: | R - Urban, Rural, and Regional Economics > R2 - Household Analysis > R21 - Housing Demand |
| Date Deposited: | 16 Feb 2015 12:49 |
| Last Modified: | 01 Oct 2024 04:04 |
| Projects: | ES/K002309/1 |
| Funders: | Economic and Social Research Council |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/60953 |
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