Risky institutions: political regimes and the cost of public borrowing in early modern Italy

Chilosi, David ORCID: 0000-0002-2251-0381 (2014) Risky institutions: political regimes and the cost of public borrowing in early modern Italy. Journal of Economic History, 74 (03). pp. 887-915. ISSN 0022-0507

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Abstract

By analyzing a newly compiled data set of interest rates on public annuities in early modern Italy, this article finds that the cost of borrowing fell in spite of growing debts and stagnating fiscal revenues. Feudalism and clerical interference increased the cost of borrowing, while parliaments, wars, and centralized fiscal institutions mattered little. The constitutional representation of creditors may have meant significant markups for republican oligarchs. These results cast doubts on the claim that the growth of absolutism was at the root of Italy's economic decline.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna...
Additional Information:	© 2014 The Economic History Association
Divisions:	Economic History
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance
JEL classification:	N - Economic History > N1 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics; Growth and Fluctuations > N13 - Europe: Pre-1913 N - Economic History > N4 - Government, War, Law, and Regulation > N43 - Europe: Pre-1913
Date Deposited:	30 Sep 2014 09:28
Last Modified:	31 Oct 2024 02:30
Funders:	Leverhulme Trust
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/59571

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