Schonhardt-Bailey, Cheryl ORCID: 0000-0002-7820-6231 (2013) Congress has a very limited ability to hold central bankers to account. LSE American Politics and Policy (13 Nov 2013). Website.
|
PDF
- Published Version
Download (360kB) | Preview |
Abstract
The financial crisis has brought new prominence to the role of central banks and bankers on both sides of the Atlantic. But who holds these powerful figures to account? In the U.S., Congress has this responsibility, but new research by Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey finds that it has been largely unable to significantly challenge the Fed since the 1970s. She argues that congressional oversight is constrained by members’ electoral incentives, a lack of expertise in monetary policy, the extreme transparency of hearings, and the sheer size of the House and Senate banking committees.
Item Type: | Online resource (Website) |
---|---|
Official URL: | http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/usappblog/ |
Additional Information: | © 2012 The Author |
Divisions: | Government |
Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) H Social Sciences > HC Economic History and Conditions H Social Sciences > HJ Public Finance |
JEL classification: | G - Financial Economics > G3 - Corporate Finance and Governance > G38 - Government Policy and Regulation |
Date Deposited: | 28 Jul 2014 11:12 |
Last Modified: | 11 Dec 2024 13:21 |
URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/58336 |
Actions (login required)
View Item |