Dietrich, Franz and List, Christian 
ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X
(2007)
Strategy-proof judgment aggregation.
Economics and Philosophy, 23 (3).
pp. 269-300.
ISSN 0266-2671
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Abstract
Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard--Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that “conclusion-based voting” is less vulnerable to manipulation than “premise-based voting”, which is strategy-proof only for “reason-oriented” individuals. Surprisingly, for “outcome-oriented” individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayJourna... |
| Additional Information: | © 2007 Cambridge University Press |
| Divisions: | Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General) B Philosophy. Psychology. Religion > B Philosophy (General) H Social Sciences > HB Economic Theory |
| Date Deposited: | 22 Jun 2008 13:56 |
| Last Modified: | 12 Apr 2024 04:21 |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5812 |
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