Which worlds are possible?: a judgment aggregation problem

List, Christian ORCID: 0000-0003-1627-800X (2008) Which worlds are possible?: a judgment aggregation problem. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 37 (1). pp. 57-65. ISSN 0022-3611

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Abstract

Suppose the members of a group (e.g., committee, jury, expert panel) each form a judgment on which worlds in a given set are possible, subject to the constraint that at least one world is possible but not all are. The group seeks to aggregate these individual judgments into a collective judgment, subject to the same constraint. I show that no judgment aggregation rule can solve this problem in accordance with three conditions: “unanimity,” “independence” and “non-dictatorship,” Although the result is a variant of an existing theorem on “group identification” (Kasher and Rubinstein, Logique et Analyse 160:385–395, 1997), the aggregation of judgments on which worlds are possible (or permissible, desirable, etc.) appears not to have been studied yet. The result challenges us to take a stance on which of its conditions to relax.

Item Type:	Article
Official URL:	http://www.springerlink.com/content/100295/
Additional Information:	© 2008 Springer
Divisions:	Government Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method CPNSS
Subjects:	H Social Sciences > H Social Sciences (General)
Date Deposited:	20 Jun 2008 11:50
Last Modified:	11 Sep 2025 07:31
URI:	http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/5807

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