Fouirnaies, Alexander B. and Hall, Andrew B. (2014) The financial incumbency advantage: causes and consequences. Journal of Politics, 76 (3). pp. 711-724. ISSN 0022-3816
Full text not available from this repository.Abstract
In this article, we use a regression discontinuity design to estimate the causal effect of incumbency on campaign contributions in the U.S. House and state legislatures. In both settings, incumbency causes approximately a 20-25 percentage-point increase in the share of donations flowing to the incumbent's party. The effect size does not vary with legislator experience and does not appear to depend on incumbent office-holder benefits. Instead, as we show, the effect is primarily the result of donations from access-oriented interest groups, especially donors from industries under heavy regulation and those with less ideological ties. Given the role of money in elections, the findings suggest that access-oriented interest groups are an important driver of the electoral security of incumbents.
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Official URL: | http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/toc/jop/current |
| Additional Information: | © 2014 Southern Political Science Association. |
| Divisions: | LSE |
| Subjects: | H Social Sciences > HG Finance |
| JEL classification: | G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G12 - Asset Pricing; Trading volume; Bond Interest Rates G - Financial Economics > G1 - General Financial Markets > G14 - Information and Market Efficiency; Event Studies |
| Date Deposited: | 23 Jun 2014 14:53 |
| Last Modified: | 24 Apr 2024 06:24 |
| Funders: | Augustinus Foundation, Frimodt-Heineke’s Foundation, Knud Højgaard’s Foundation, Institute for Quantitative Social Science |
| URI: | http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/id/eprint/57119 |
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